‘The Unexamined Life is Not Worth Living’ Socrates
Philosophy, as a study, teaches its fair share of valuable life skills. Above all, however, is the way the subject demands one to constantly question pre-established beliefs, views and intuitions. So often we brand individual acts as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ without proper understanding whether these ‘values’ even exist. We watched, blamed and accused everyone in Al Qaeda as ‘terrorists’ and ‘evil people’ without fully contemplating whether or not anyone or anything can truly ever be ‘evil’ or indeed ‘wrong’. For, presumably, punishment for wrong acts and awards for ‘right’ behaviour is only logical if these values exist in the first place. The purposes of this piece, is to discuss, debate and evaluate the extent to which moral realism, the view that moral values exist, is logically coherent.
To be a moral cognitivist is to believe that moral values exist and are knowable. On the other hand, to be a moral non-cognitivist is to believe the opposite; that moral values do not in fact exist and subsequently they cant be known. Here, we will discuss the metaphysical debate at hand; that is whether moral values exist, as oppose to whether these moral values are knowable. There are three cognitivist positions which we will discuss in turn; firstly moral values as transcendental, moral values existing as natural properties and lastly, moral values existing as non natural properties.
Greek philosopher Plato first argued that moral values are real in the sense that they are transcendental. By transcendental, I mean existing in a spiritual form. Plato's philosophical argument for this is greatest understood following a consideration of his theory of the Forms. Plato argued that there existed; in a spiritual sense, a realm of Forms where everything existed. Plato had several justifications for this. Firstly, he argued, that it was perplex how one recognised a circle to be non-perfect without ever seeing a perfect circle, for it is often argued by many that a perfect circle is merely an ideal and something which isn't often experienced through ones senses. However, for Plato, this recognising of imperfection without ever having experienced perfection showed that there existed a ‘perfect circle’ in some spiritual sense, which Plato branded ‘the Form of the Circle’. Plato further argued that humans recognise things in so far that they correlate with the Form that they belong to. For instance, how do we know that Golden Retrievers, Labradors and Poodles are all different modifications of dogs? Plato would argue that they all possess characteristics that, are, in some way, part of the Form of the Dog. Continuing from this reasoning, Plato believed moral values to exist in the same way. For an act to be considered wrong it must participate in the Form of Evil.
 |
Plato - 'All Philosophy is fontnotes to Plato' |
However, the metaphysics of Plato’s theory has several holes. Firstly, Plato is a rationalist; he believes that knowledge is gainable through pure reasoning and no sense experience. Rene Descartes, in Meditations, another Rationalist, argued that the senses ‘deceive’ and that they cant be trusted as a result. For instance, how can one be sure that they are not dreaming? Or how can one know that they are not being deceived by a malicious demon? Scientists, however, and empiricists argue that all knowledge is gainable purely through sense experience; that is through the use of ones ears, mouths, touch, vision etc. Therefore, for scientists such as J.L.Mackie, nothing can exist if it is not preliminarily explained via sense experience. Therefore, Plato’s metaphysics fails, because the Forms are not able to be experienced through ones senses; as they are non physical and exist in an entirely separate, distinct, spiritual realm. Along with Mackies criticism, we can use also use arguments offered by Aristotle, Plato’s student. Aristotle argued that Plato’s reasoning is logically incoherent because presumably there must be a Form of the Form of the Circle and a Form of the Form of the Form of the Circle and so on. In this sense it is simply illogical and utter philosophically wrong. Based on these counter arguments I’m not going to consider moral values existing as transcendental beings.
Next, however, is the belief that moral values are identical with natural properties. A natural property is one which is explainable through science and therefore sense experience. On these grounds it bypasses the criticism given by both Mackie and Aristotle. Utilitarianism is the belief that the morally ‘good’ thing to do is the one which brings about the greatest happiness for the greatest number. For example, if one has the opportunity to bring happiness to 2 people at the expense of the other; than they must choose the two. Therefore, on the this basis moral values exist in the sense that they are identical with natural properties. Presumably, no one denies that these natural properties exist and therefore moral values do exist in so far that natural properties exist.
However, G.E. Moore offers a hammer blow counter argument to this belief. Moore argues that if one was to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number and therefore did the ‘good’ thing, it would still make sense logically to ask whether or not this outcome was ‘good’. Consider, Hitler and the Nazis, hypothetically of course, were victorious in the Second World War. Through their pursuit of World domination they destroy all in their path who argue against their beliefs. Now, once this purge is over, everyone left in the World will belong to the Nazi party and therefore will be happy as they have received the outcome they wanted. Therefore the greatest happiness for the greatest number has been achieved and as a result moral goodness has also been achieved because Goodness = greatest happiness for the greatest number according to the moral cognitivist. However, G.E.Moore argues that in this circumstance it still makes sense to question whether there is any goodness in what has happened and as a result of this making logical sense it cant possibly be the case that goodness=happiness for the greatest number. Furthermore, Moore argues on logical grounds that goodness = happiness is incoherent because the two words don't mean the same thing. In philosophy if the truth value of a sentence is contained within the words of the sentence than it is tautological truth. However, Moore argues that the sentence goodness = happiness is not a tautology and therefore the two words don't mean the same thing. Therefore, moral values as natural properties fails on these two accounts.
 |
Frege |
Although, there is a counter argument to the above point. Philosopher, Frege, argues that philosophical debates over pure semantics, that is language, is foolish to some extent. Frege uses the example of Plato’s two moons; hesporus and phosophorus. Plato’s morning moon has a different name to its evening moon. However, the sentence hesporus = phosophorus is not tautological and therefore on Moore’s argument don't refer to the same thing. However, clearly they do refer to the same thing but merely have different words for the morning moon is the same moon that appears in the evening. Therefore, this counter argument might still protect the metaphysical argument of moral values existing as natural properties. Although, Moore’s Open Question argument; that is that it still remains sense to question whether there is any good even after the greatest happiness for the greatest number is achieved.
G.E.Moore further offers his own metaphysical justification for moral cognitivism; which he states is that moral values exist as non-natural properties. A non natural property is different to a transcendental property in the sense that it belongs to the fragment of this universe but is not merely explainable in terms of sense experience. The Correspondence Theory of Truth states that a proposition is true if so far that it corresponds with a state of affairs in the World. For example, the proposition that the sky is blue is true merely because there exists a state of affairs where the sky is indeed blue. Therefore, for a moral judgement to make sense, e.g. the proposition that setting fire to cats is cruel, their must exist a state of affairs where setting fire to cats is indeed cruel. Furthermore, the statement that the ‘snow is white’ is true because there exists a property of ‘whiteness’ that the snow indeed possesses. Moore argues that moral values exist but they are irreducible and therefore can't be understood empirically, through sense experience. For Moore, goodness=goodness and nothing more because it goodness is irreducible; it is simply goodness.
 |
British Philosopher A.J. Ayer |
However, can something truly exist if it cant be verified through either sense experience or reasoning? A.J. Ayer, and the logical positivists, argue that sentence is only meaningful if it can be either empirically verified or analytically verified. For example, the sentence 2+2 = 4 is correct because it can be verified using mental reasoning; mathematics. Furthermore, the sentence ‘the sky is blue’ can be verified through pure sense experience; that is actually seeing that the sky is blue. Ayer, however, concludes that statements about moral judgements aren't able to be verified either empirically or rationally. For instance, the statement ‘it was wrong of you to steal that money’ is not an example of an analytic truth because the truth value is not contained within the words used. In the way that 2+2=4 is analytic because it can be deduced through pure reasoning. In the same way, Ayer argues that there is no way to empirically verify whether the statement ‘it was wrong of you to steal that money’ is meaningful. For instance, imagine one freeze-framed the exact moment that an elderly woman was robbed of her purse by a gang of young people; Ayer would argue that you still cant ‘see’ the ‘wrongness’. If you analyse the situation empirically there appears no moment or exact spot where the ‘wrongness’ exists. On these grounds; the statement is not empirically verifiable and therefore has no meaning according to the logical positivists.
Perhaps controversially, Ayer then puts forward his own non-cognitivst position. Ayer argues that given statements about morality have no means to be verified; they are utterly meaningless. Due to this, Ayer likens statements about moral judgements to pure expressions of emotion. In Ayers opinion the statement ‘it was wrong of you to steal that money’ is the same as ‘it was wrong of you to steal that money :( (cry face)’. Ayer describes this position as Emotivism. For Ayer statements about morality are purely descriptive and only describe how one is feeling. They do not however correspond to a state of affairs that do in fact exist. However, Ayer’s emotivism appears incorrect. For when one states their moral judgement they state it using the same language techniques that they would use to state logical truths; such as 2+2=4. For presumably to state a proposition is to, in most cases, believe the proposition itself to be true; otherwise why would one bother stating it in the same manner that they stated a logical truth?
 |
Show Me The 'Wrongness' |
Before concluding, it is important, I believe to discuss the strongest argument of non-cognitivists. Now, a relativist would argue that given different people in different times and places have held different moral beliefs shows that absolute moral values do not exist in the sense that an action is ‘good’ because it relates to some ultimate goodness. Instead, a relativist would continue to argue that due to this lack of convergence; it appears moral values do not exist; and morality is merely a local phenomena. For example, the Romans weren’t wrong for using Gladiators as sport, nor was Hitler ‘wrong’ for pursuing global domination (I hate to be deliberately provocative, I just cant help it) and, lately, the actions of Islamic State are not ‘wrong’ in so far that the cultures these three separate examples have developed within believe these actions not to be wrong. For a cognitivist, such as myself, moral values are absolute; actions can be entirely wrong and entirely right. But for relativists, actions are wrong and right in so far that they are deemed wrong or right by their local culture of community.
On purely philosophical grounds, relativism has several argumentative flaws. Firstly it assumes that a lack of convergence implies a lack of truth value. Consider, there was a time not so long ago where the majority of people believed that the Earth was entirely flat. Now, using the logic of the relativist, this convergence of belief; that is the idea that everyone believed the earth to be flat, implies that this belief was true. However, clearly we now ‘know’ that the Earth is not flat. On these grounds, just because people disagree over what is right and wrong doesn't show that there exists no absolute moral values; for people can be incorrect when debating whether an action is right or wrong. Secondly, in my opinion, moral relativism is wrong in so far that it assumes a divergence of opinion when discussing moral judgements. For if there was no convergence over what is right and wrong; social order would cease to exist. As David Hume argued, if people didn't agree on what is right and wrong they wouldn't oblige to social laws, presumably people would simply go around causing havoc. However this doesn't happen, instead humans live amongst each other relatively pleasantly. Furthermore, as Dennet argued, differences only shine based on a wall of similarity, for otherwise they wouldn't be different. Specs of green show up on white because of the solid background. Although a rather boring analogy to make; perhaps differences in moral judgements are only apparent because there is general convergence over what is right and wrong. It appears that most people do believe the actions of the Nazis during the Holocaust to be ‘wrong’ in an absolute manner, not just a purely relativist way.
 |
David Hume |
In conclusion, I believe moral values exist in the following way. John Locke discussed primary and secondary qualities of objects. Primary qualities include; mass, size, weight, shape etc. However, secondary qualities include; colour, smell, texture etc. Locke believed, however, that secondary qualities had the power of causation. That is they could cause you to believe things. For example, a red London bus under a street lamp appears green, or a straight stick in water appears bent, or melted wax smells different to solid wax. However, clearly, the secondary properties in each of these objects still cause us to believe, or remember, that the objects remain the same. For me, moral values exist as secondary properties of actions. Consider the previous freeze-frame we discussed of the elderly woman being robbed. Although the freezeframed picture shows no ‘wrongness’ the mere fact it causes me to be upset, distressed and ultimately believe it is ‘wrong’ shows that there exists some value of wrongness here. In this sense, moral values do not exist ‘physically’ but they do exist causally and I believe this is enough to hold a moral cognitivist position.